universal rebel worker, his name inseparable from the unique militant unionism he embraced.
In his last testament Hill requested that he be cremated and his ashes spread across the world. That too became a symbolic political act that was to live on almost a century after his death. Hill's ashes were sent in packets to iww locals across the globe. One small package never reached its destination, being confiscated in 1918 by the US Post Office then forwarded to the fbi for safekeeping. In 1986 the package was rediscovered and eventually turned over to the Chicago headquarters of the still surviving iww.
Adler ends the story with a final ceremonial and scattering of ashes in Chicago, but here he makes a minor error in the account. Almost infinitesimal pinches were also sent to organizations and individuals around the world. One packet was sent to the Toronto, Ontario iww local. At the volatile Eaton's strike Wobblies stirred Hill's ashes into a bin meant to provide heat. A whiff of this dust was enclosed in a red leather locket inscribed with Joe Hill's words "Don't Mourn -Organise!" and given to me when I performed in concert during a May Day festival.
A year later, performing at Hamilton's Festival of Friends, I was approached by a member of a First Nations drum circle and asked what the locket signified. I told him the story of the rebel martyr. "This," he said, "is very powerful" and asked if he could hold the locket. He recounted the story to the other brothers of the circle and each placed his hand on the shoulder of the other forming a chain to draw upon the power of Joe Hill's spirit. Some 96 years after his execution that spirit apparently lives on.
Len In developing her first argument, Roof identifies four public policies that were central to labour's conception of workers' welfare and examines its goals and influence on these policies from 1946 onward. The four policies are full employment planning, income security programs (including minimum wage laws and retirement and unemployment insurance), labour law, and universal health insurance. In all four of these policy areas Roof shows that labour's efforts to extend and improve social and labour protections were frustrated to one degree or another. In the case of full employment planning, the union movement did win two pieces of legislation, the Employment Act of 1946 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth (or Humphrey-Hawkins) Act of 1978, but both acts were largely symbolic, passed only after compromises stripped them of key union-backed provisions. In the realm of income security programs labour made "incremental" gains, such as increased coverage and benefits in both the minimum wage and Social Security, but failed to achieve such objectives as indexation of the minimum wage to inflation and federal standards for unemployment insurance.
In both labour law and health care policy labour was "stalemated" for most of the post-World War II period. After the anti-labour Taft-Hartley Act passed over President Harry Truman's veto in 1947, labour was unable to repeal either the entire Act or its section 14(b), which allowed states to pass "right to work" laws that prohibit union shop agreements, and subsequently failed to win reform proposals intended to better protect worker rights and facilitate union organizing. Finally, from the late 1940s on unions were rebuffed in their attempts to pass universal health insurance. Medicare and Medicaid, enacted in 1965, were significant achievements that owed much to labour support, but they fell short of universal health insurance. Labour also provided crucial support for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that President Barack Obama signed into law in March of 2010, which (if it survives legal and political challenges) will get close to universal health insurance, but Roof emphasizes how different that legislation is from labour's traditional preference for a single-payer national health insurance system.
What explains labour's failure to achieve its goal of a more comprehensive and universalistic welfare state? Rejecting explanations focused either on the weakness of labour and the left or on the strategic failures of union leaders, Roof locates the limits on labour's policy influence in the institutional structure of the American state, especially the fragmented legislative process derived from the US Constitution and the several minority protections and veto points that developed over time in the Congress. In particular, Roof identifies the congressional committee system, the Rules Committee in the House of Representatives, the seniority rule, and the Senate filibuster, together with the presidential veto and the equal representation of states in the Senate, as the key obstacles to greater labour influence on social and labour legislation. She makes a strong case that these legislative institutions and procedures blocked, delayed, or compromised labour's policy objectives even when they had majority support in Congress.
But who or what utilized them to thwart or limit labour's policy influence? Roof's answer is the "conservative coalition" of southern Democrats and northern Republicans that often ruled the congressional roost from the late 1930s to the mid-1960s. This part of her analysis is familiar ground to students of labour and social policy. Roof's contribution is to demonstrate that the conservative coalition was often a minority coalition in Congress, and that its success at blocking or compromising labour and social legislation was premised on the availability of minority protections and veto points like the seniority rule and the filibuster in the legislative process.
Roof's first argument raises the question of whether and how organized labour responded to the frequent frustration of its policy objectives by the conservative coalition's use of institutional obstacles in the legislative process. Her second argument supplies the answer: from the late 1940s through the mid-1970s, the labour movement pursued a political strategy of civil rights reform, party realignment, and congressional reform. It sought to enfranchise southern African Americans and mobilize them as Democratic Party voters, drive conservative white southerners from the Party and empower its urban-labour wing, and change the rules and procedures of the law-making process in order to break the grip of the conservative coalition on it. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s these strategic objectives were largely accomplished, but "labor did not get the liberal transformation of the political system it expected." (146) In the long run labour's political strategy weakened the conservative coalition and made the Democratic Party a more liberal and pro-labour party. But in the short run it destabilized the labour-liberal alliance and the New Deal coalition and further fragmented the legislative process. The result, from the late 1960s onward, was growing Republican and conservative control of the White House and later Congress. Yet, Roof finds a silver lining in the dark cloud of conservative ascendancy between 1980 and 2008: labour was able to use the very institutional obstacles in the legislative process that had for so long obstructed its political influence to fend off most of the conservative threats to past gains in labour and social protections.
As well argued and persuasive as Roof's book is, it is not a comprehensive or airtight analysis of welfare state development in the United States. Her selection of the four policies was based upon her judgment of the priorities of labour's policy agenda, not upon a theoretical analysis of the nature and boundaries of the welfare state, which her book does not provide. Her judgment of labour's policy priorities seems sound, and her book provides a fine analysis of labour's influence on the labour and social programs most important to it. But as significant as those four policies are, they do not exhaust the welfare state, which not only includes many other programs of transfer spending and in-kind benefits but also, in the enlarged conception of the welfare state favoured by some social scientists, tax expenditures and publicly subsidized and regulated employer benefits. The institutional and political dynamics and policy outcomes of these other programs sometimes differ from those of the policies that Roof examined. In addition, Roof does not assess or refute some leading alternative explanations of the social policies that she does examine, such as the "path dependence" explanation of retirement and health insurance policies that Jacob Hacker advanced in The Divided Welfare State (2002) . (Roof's lack of engagement with path dependence as explanation of welfare state development is odd since the concept has been central to the historical institutionalist approach with which she identifies.) Roof cannot be faulted for not examining all welfare state policies, of course, and she does not proclaim her book to be a comprehensive or definitive analysis of welfare state development. But neither does she call attention to the limited range of social policies she covers or to some prominent alternative explanations.
Roof's book also pays little attention to the role and influence of business, either in the process of welfare state development or that of political change. In her analysis of welfare state development, she argues convincingly that the defeat or compromise of progressive social and labour policies was less a product of business lobbying than of institutional obstacles in the legislative process. If employer provided social benefits are included in the welfare state, however, the role of business looks different. As Hacker has argued, the main influence of business in welfare state development was exercised not through lobbying on public programs but through its initiative in providing social benefits to employees, which subsequently constrained the development of public programs. But lack of attention to business is even more problematical when Roof examines the period of "conservative ascendancy," as she calls it, from 1980 to 2008. Roof's only attempt to explain the right turn in American politics lies in her argument that organized labour's successful efforts on behalf of civil rights legislation, party realignment, and congressional reform had the unintended consequence of destabilizing the labour-liberal alliance and Democratic coalition and bolstering Republican electoral fortunes. The realignment of southern whites from the Democratic to the Republican Party from 1964 onward had a lot to do with Republican resurgence and conservative ascendancy, but it was not the whole story. A massive political mobilization of the business community, dating from the early 1970s, was crucial to the rising fortunes of the Republican Party and its dominant conservative faction, as scholars like Thomas Edsall and David Vogel showed years ago. The conservative ascendancy that threatened welfare state development was a product of active business and conservative mobilization and struggle.
A final reservation concerns Roof's defence of the labour-Democratic Party alliance. Compelling as it is, it rests on her particular choice of policies. If we examined trade and industrial policy, I think we would find that the labour-Democratic alliance was more complicated, and much less favourable for the labour movement, than in the policy areas Roof examined. That does not mean that unions should abandon the alliance, but it does suggest that the alliance should be evaluated across a broader range of policies.
These In tHe Interest of Democracy is a valuable contribution to the scholarship on the ways in which organized labour in the US was aligned with the American government to oppose communist states, parties, and unions. Hughes examines the development of and tensions in the relationship between the American Federation of Labor's (afl) international anti-communist arm, the Free Trade Union Committee (ftuc), and the Central Intelligence Agency (cia). The period she focuses on extends from the establishment of the ftuc in 1944 until the early 1950s, which she argues marks the end of their collaboration in anticommunist endeavours internationally. Based on archival collections opened in the mid-1990s, Hughes' research provides detailed evidence about the nature of this relationship, helping to clarify some of the historical debates and speculation about whether these organizations in fact did work together and how.
